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An Overburdened Term: Dewey’s Concept of 
“Experience” as Curriculum Theory
Jayson Seaman and Peter J. Nelsen
From the start, John Dewey’s ideas about education have been prone to misunder-
standing. One of the greatest casualties has been “experience,” a term so routinely 
misappropriated that Dewey ultimately decided to abandon it. He wrote, “I would 
abandon the term ‘experience’ because of my growing realization that the historical 
obstacles which prevented understanding of my use of ’experience’ are, for all prac-
tical purposes, insurmountable. I would substitute the term ‘culture’ because with 
its meanings as now firmly established it can fully and freely carry my philosophy 
of experience” (1981, p. 361). Dewey evidently recognized that a main challenge to 
understanding experience was the conceptual weight the term had been made to 
carry. Because it was so central to his entire metaphysics, the challenge of under-
standing experience spills over into the project of grasping his vision for schooling, 
including what he was fundamentally attempting to do by employing experience 
in an educational sense in the first place. Adding to this challenge is the range and 
organization of Dewey’s ideas on the matter: he sometimes wrote or lectured about 
experience and education together (1938), sometimes independently (1932, 1934a, 
1990), and sometimes in relation to other issues (1899, 1958, 1980). He also did not 
always mention them directly, yet they are often implicated in discussions of other 
topics (1999a, 1999b). After devoting so much time to developing his concept of 
experience over the years, it is noteworthy that Dewey abandoned it; he might have 
anticipated the misconstruals that would persist throughout the latter half of the 
twentieth century as they did in the first.
In this article, Dewey’s core educational concept of experience is interpreted 
in light of his broader aims for reconstructing American democracy, his critique of 
political economy, and his identification with anthropological thought. We mean 
to propose a more expansive interpretation of experience than what is commonly 
represented in the educational literature. We suggest that, for Dewey, experience 
was a polysemic term serving several functions across different philosophical con-
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cerns: it tethered thinking to practical activity, invoked the interactional nature of 
human existence, and functioned as an integrating principle that helped reconcile 
contradictions among theoretical domains, from psychology to cultural-historical 
evolution. The concept also led Dewey to formulate a curricular logic based primar-
ily on anthropological themes, which, although most concretely developed while he 
was at the University of Chicago, informed his ongoing critique of other theories 
that conceived of curriculum in terms of transmitting disciplinary knowledge and 
maximizing educational outcomes for individuals, which Dewey argued only per-
petuated social problems (Westbrook, 1993). Our aim is to suggest that experience, 
when applied educationally, should be interpreted in light of Dewey’s larger effort 
to establish democratic controls over an increasingly corrosive social, economic, 
and psychological order brought about by industrial capitalism. 
Our argument is motivated by the way experience is often attributed to Dewey 
in the contemporary educational literature, especially in the experiential or experi-
ence-based learning (EBL) tradition, where he is frequently named as the foremost 
intellectual progenitor in foundational (e.g., Boud, Keogh, & Walker, 1985; Kolb, 
1984; Moon, 2004) and applied texts (e.g., Beard & Wilson, 2006; Wurdinger, 2005). 
Despite his presumed influence in this literature, the connections between Dew-
ey’s notion of experience and his broader political, educational, and philosophical 
agendas are often underspecified, stripping the concept of important meaning. EBL 
advocates are not the sole claimants to a Deweyan heritage, however; many social 
justice and civic educators cite his emphasis on critical reflection and democratic 
life, yet they do not often make experience a central focus or emphasize his prag-
matism within their discussions. For example, in the recently published Handbook 
of Critical Education (Apple, Au, & Gandin, 2009), Dewey’s arguments regarding 
the relationship of education and democracy are referenced several times without 
indicating what they imply about a comprehensive curriculum for critical education. 
We believe Dewey’s educational use of experience could inform such a cur-
riculum, but, because of existing interpretations and omissions, the concept tends 
to suffer from three reductions at the hands of advocates and critics alike: as an 
apolitical pedagogy of learning by doing, as one that emphasizes collectivist demo-
cratic participation but is insufficiently political, or as one that is sufficiently political 
but unsystematic in its approach to education.1 Such judgments, we argue, emerge 
from an under-examination of Dewey’s principle of experience. We propose that the 
concept helped Dewey establish a coherent curriculum theory that was far-reaching 
in its implications for schooling, but it is understandable only in light of his more 
encompassing aim to rescue the promise of democracy from the deleterious effects 
of industrial capitalism so the spoils of technological progress could be directed to 
more humane and individually fulfilling ends.
Our argument proceeds as follows. In the first section we review Dewey’s 
characterization in the EBL literature, which tends to conflate experience with 
student-centered constructivism. In the second section, we build a background for 
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understanding Dewey’s curricular logic by drawing upon several of his social and 
political essays that critique industrial capitalism as an economic and ideological 
system. We also discuss Dewey’s conceptualization of individualism as a histori-
cal construct and consciousness as socially constituted, since this shapes the edu-
cational meaning of experience in substantial ways. In the third section we review 
Dewey’s unique curricular logic, particularly his adoption of culture-epochs as an 
organizing scheme and occupations as a main instructional vehicle (DeFalco, 2010; 
Fallace, 2008). These are concretely realized experiences in any given instance and 
they also evidence his enduring view that the concept should systematically inform 
curriculum design, specifically in service of the historical changes he envisioned. 
We conclude by briefly reviewing current curricular models that reflect the priori-
ties outlined in the body of the article. We point to the growing critical pragmatist 
literature as well as that of contemporary activity theorists, since we see these as 
highly relevant to future inquiry into experience as a Deweyan tradition.
Experience, not Experiential 
Nowhere are references to experience more ubiquitous, yet its meaning more opaque, 
than in the EBL literature. Here, Dewey’s contribution is typically presented as fol-
lows: “Dewey championed education for democracy and placed emphasis on active 
learning, experimentation, and problem solving. Dewey’s pragmatic approach con-
nects theory with practice and requires students to similarly connect reflection with 
action” (Kellner & Share, 2007, p. 65). On the one hand, these clearly are pedagogi-
cal elements that Dewey promoted. On the other hand, authors rarely make any 
explicit connection between key terms like experimentation, problem solving, and 
reflection and the core curricular issues of scope and sequence and subject mat-
ter, all of which remained career-long preoccupations for Dewey. For instance, in 
Experience and Education, he writes: “Unless experience is so conceived that the 
result is a plan for deciding upon subject matter, upon methods of instruction and 
discipline, and upon material equipment and social organization of the school, it 
is wholly in the air” (1938, p. 28). Despite this demand for specificity in such a ca-
nonical text, the EBL literature often makes experience out to have no coherent es-
sence, inviting readers to project their own ideas onto it and giving the impression 
that Dewey’s educational philosophy is less programmatic and more flexible than 
it actually was. Carver and Enfield (2006) express this view: “Dewey’s philosophy 
provides a lens for seeing the quality of educational experiences. It does not provide 
a template for building an educational program” (p. 56). This position risks reduc-
ing experience simply to a set of criteria for designing learning activities that are 
more participatory than other alternatives.
This interpretation has underwritten a range of practices, from those that ap-
proximate real-world situations to those intended to enrich classroom lessons. In 
one overview of the EBL field, Andresen, Boud, and Cohen (1999) list the follow-
ing: “internships, work placement, on-the-job training, excursions, adventure and 
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wilderness trips, studios, laboratories, workshops, clinicals, practicums, case study 
approaches, action research, role plays, hypotheticals, and simulations,” along with 
“active learning in lectures, computer simulations, use of realistic models, video-
based activities, group discussions and syndicate methods, autobiographical writ-
ing, problem-based learning, group work, use of reflective journals and self-directed 
projects” (p. 231). The catalog provided by the authors presumably illustrates the 
extent to which experience has permeated practice, but, borrowing a phrase from 
Jane Margolis, it also makes it seem like a coat closet—“you can hang anything on 
it” (as cited in Maxwell, 2005, p. 43). Dewey’s own misgivings about the term should 
raise doubt that the concept can plausibly be stretched across all of the uses found 
in the literature and in practice without becoming essentially meaningless. We 
take this to be Kliebard’s (1995) point when he argues that Dewey’s ideas are often 
reduced to “a pitiful caricature, such as learning by doing” (p. 27). 
Our aim here is not to prove that EBL advocates have got Dewey wrong in 
any absolute sense. Indeed, some of their major priorities reflect Deweyan themes: 
educators ought to promote reflective thinking, foster social dispositions, create co-
operative environments, make knowledge relevant to the learner, develop problem-
solving skills, encourage lifelong learning, build connections to the community, help 
create socially just institutions, and so on. But most conceptions of experience-based 
learning stop here, which still falls short of grasping Dewey’s full conception. Our 
purpose is therefore to outline a more expansive interpretation of experience to 
serve as a reference point for future forms of so-called experience-based education.
It will be useful to keep Dewey’s turn toward culture in mind throughout our 
discussion, since this indicates the order of conceptual magnitude he had in mind 
in applying experience to education. For him, any practice, and any theory that 
supports it, can be considered educative only when “extended to include how this 
and that social condition works causally to modify the experience and affect the 
character and capacity of individuals who come under its influence” (Dewey, 1933, 
p. 82), an accomplishment requiring “a well-thought out philosophy of the social 
factors that operate in the constitution of individual experience” (1938, p. 21). These 
social factors were historically, politically, economically, and geographically expan-
sive, and he argued vociferously for their consideration in theories of curriculum.
Economic Dimensions of Experience and their Influence on 
Schooling  
Foremost in Dewey’s thinking was the significance of industrial production and 
distribution in determining the course of modern historical events, including those 
shaping the nature of education. He discusses this as early as 1899, in The School 
and Social Progress:
The [social] change that . . . overshadows and controls all the others, is the 
industrial one—the application of science resulting in the great inventions 
that have utilized the forces of nature on a vast and inexpensive scale: the 
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growth of a world-wide market as the object of production, of vast manu-
facturing centers to supply this market, of cheap and rapid means of com-
munication and distribution between all its parts . . . Through it, the face of 
the earth is making over, even as to its physical forms; political boundaries 
are wiped out and moved about, as if they were indeed only lines on a paper 
map; population is hurriedly gathered into cities from the ends of the earth; 
habits of living are altered with startling abruptness and thoroughness; the 
search for the truths of nature is infinitely stimulated and facilitated, and 
their application to life not only practicable, but commercially necessary. 
Even our moral and religious ideas and interests, the most conservative 
because the deepest-lying things in our nature, are profoundly affected. 
That this revolution should not affect education in some other than a for-
mal and superficial fashion is inconceivable. (pp. 456-457)
The passage above signals Dewey’s awareness of the impact of industry on human 
association, an analysis he would continue to develop to the point where, in 1930, 
he concluded bluntly: “economic determinism is now a fact, not a theory” (p. 58). 
Here he approaches Marx in his critique of political economy, and because industrial 
capitalism ushered in such a major world-historical change, it figured prominently 
in his thinking about social problems and their possible educational remedies. The 
passage below elaborates on this early awareness, forming the basis of the educa-
tional priorities he expounded over the next 40 years:
At present, impulses which lie at the basis of the industrial system are either 
practically neglected or positively distorted during the school period. Until 
the instincts of construction and production are systematically laid hold of 
in the years of childhood and youth, until they are trained in social direc-
tions, enriched by historical interpretation, controlled and illuminated by 
scientific methods, we certainly are in no position even to locate the source 
of our economic evils, much less to deal with them effectively. (pp. 464-465)
In these passages, Dewey throws down the gauntlet for modern curriculum 
theorists. His own vision was to develop a system of education that would “lay hold 
of” human creative impulses, realized through processes of individual development 
and societal production—that is, play and labor—and prevent them from being 
distorted by the economic forces of capitalism, aiming them instead to rationally 
deliberated, humanely social, and individually fulfilling ends. In his terms, “the 
ultimate place of economic organization in human life is to assure the secure basis 
for an ordered expression of individual capacity and for the satisfaction of the needs 
of man in noneconomic directions” (Dewey, 1999b, p. 88). This formed the heart 
of Dewey’s progressive agenda and also represented the educational challenge to 
which experience would be put.
Realizing Dewey’s progressive aims not only involved the practical matter of 
designing a new curriculum, however. It also created a need to solve deeper philo-
sophical problems. Liberalism had so far provided the foundation for aims such as 
E&C   Education and Culture
10    Jayson Seaman and Peter J. Nelsen
the “ordered expression of individual capacity,” but in Dewey’s view, the historical 
accomplishments of liberalism had been distorted by capitalism. He saw the need to 
rearrange the priorities of the individual and social over the economic, for until this 
occurred, America’s structural problems would persist and both individual potential 
and cultural evolution would be thwarted. But, in contrast to other liberal reform-
ers of his day, whom he derided, Dewey’s democratic vision was fully pragmatic; 
it “does not tell us to ‘re-arm morally’ and all social problems would be solved. It 
says, Find out how the constituents of our existing culture are operating and then 
see to it that whenever and wherever needed they be modified in order that their 
workings may release and fulfill the possibilities of human nature” (1989, p. 98). 
These constituents involved both societal relations and individual consciousness.
Societal relations  
Dewey’s writing about the antidemocratic forces of industrial capitalism is espe-
cially direct during and after the Depression. He reported “vast and concentrated 
aggregations of wealth; there are monopolies of power; great unemployment; a shut-
ting down of doors of opportunity, a gulf between rich and poor, and no frontier to 
which the hard-put can migrate. In consequence, the problem of democracy is no 
longer chiefly governmental and political. It is industrial and financial—economic” 
(1932, p. 96). The depression had made it clear that America’s democratic promise 
would be realized only with conscious attention to economic forces. While they were 
most overtly visible in class relations, they had also permeated the social institu-
tions responsible for cultural evolution, namely, science and education. In Experi-
ence and Education (1938), Dewey wrote: “[the economic and industrial problems 
of the present society] . . . are the products to a very large extent of the application 
of science in production and distribution of commodities and services, while the 
latter processes are the most important factor in determining the present relations 
of human beings and social groups to one another” (p. 80).
Here, as elsewhere, Dewey regards science as the highest source of modern 
knowledge and technological innovation, and capitalism as the force that had ac-
celerated its progress and distributed its spoils unequally. One of his main educa-
tional aims was thus to elevate scientific reasoning over economic logic, effectively 
reversing modern trends. This not only meant practicing the experimental method 
in schools as a formal procedure, it involved the way knowledge distribution was 
conceived within competing curricular ideologies. Dewey’s argument was therefore 
economic and political as well as epistemological: powerful class divisions that were 
“a heritage from the institutions of a prescientific age” (1938, p. 81) controlled not just 
the distribution of goods and services, but the way knowledge was organized within 
school curricula. He wrote: “The last stand of oligarchical and anti-social seclusion 
is perpetuation of this purely individualistic notion of intelligence” (1999b, p. 57). 
Dewey linked the individualistic view of mind to the social conditions of capitalism, 
which sponsors “the division into ‘cultured’ people and ‘workers,’ the separation of 
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theory and practice” (1899, p. 466). Other curricular ideologies viewing culture and 
intelligence as individual properties were therefore complicit in social problems, 
and schooling based on these ideas would only perpetuate economic disparities. 
As a result, doing away with theory/practice dualisms was both an intellectual task 
and also a social and economic one, requiring a radically different program than 
those entailed by other curriculum theories. 
The interactional dimension of experience provided one foundation for such 
a program. Dewey eschewed the privatization of knowledge and instead wanted it 
to be “put into circulation” (Dewey, 1899, p. 465), fomenting an “intellectual revo-
lution” that was necessarily also a political revolution. But, in contrast to a Marx-
ist uprising—a reading of history he saw unfolding tragically in Stalinist Russia 
(see Dewey, 1934b; 1989, ch. 4)—Dewey saw active, democratic education as a key 
method for consciously redistributing cultural resources and life opportunities so 
that economic activities would be made “servants of the development of the higher 
capacities of individuals” (Dewey, 1991, p. 40) rather than the other way around. 
Collaboration was of course central to this project, enabling children to actively ap-
propriate cultural funds of knowledge and contribute creatively to them. However, 
the idea that education could be leveraged to consciously redirect social forces also 
implicated existing theories of individualism.
Historicizing the individual 
Dewey’s social critique did not stop with broad historical trends; it included the 
formation of individual consciousness as well as the way mind itself was conceived. 
Throughout several social and political texts Dewey stated unequivocally that in-
dividualism itself is socially and historically constituted. In Freedom and Culture 
(1989), he wrote: “Whether complete identification of human nature with individu-
ality would be desirable or undesirable if it existed is an idle academic question. For 
it does not exist” (p. 24). In Individualism, Old and New (1999) he stated as “fact” 
that “the mental and moral structure of individuals, the pattern of their desires 
and purposes, change with every great change in social constitution . . . producing 
the framework of personal disposition” (pp. 40-41). Even morality, which seems to 
have prima facie status as an attribute of individual reflection, should not be con-
ceived as the “conscious testing of conduct by an inner and self-imposed standard” 
but operates “largely through habit rather than through choice” (Dewey & Tufts, 
1909, p. 31). In short, learning and development are thoroughly social processes 
and could not be understood through existing, atomistic theories of individualism.
One way to understand Dewey’s critique of competing curriculum theories 
is through this line of argumentation. The domination of capitalism over social, 
political, and economic life, what he called “corporateness,” had become “internal 
. . . realized in thought and purpose . . . qualitative” (Dewey, 1999b, p. 25); it had al-
tered human subjectivity. Moreover, with the invention of the machine, he argued, 
industry and business had developed “a scope and power they never had in the past 
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from which they derive,” perverting “the whole ideal of individualism to conform 
to the practices of a pecuniary culture” and becoming “the source and justification 
of inequalities and oppressions” (Dewey, 1999b, p. 9). Here Dewey foregrounds the 
individual less so learners might be conceived as social beings with compelling 
personal biographies, and more to draw attention to the way individualism itself 
had functioned as a belief system over time. The hegemony of industrial capital-
ism—accelerated by technological developments and shored up by liberal theories 
that, although successful in supporting individual sovereignty in the waning days 
of feudalism, were now obsolete—had transformed the promise of the individual 
from a sovereign political entity into a structurally bound economic one. 
This conclusion shaped the specific version of liberal theory Dewey adopted, 
which he called “radical liberalism” and “fighting liberalism.” In Liberalism and So-
cial Action (1991) he argued that “liberalism that takes its profession of the impor-
tance of individuality with sincerity must be deeply concerned about the structure 
of human association” (p. 48). Through his brand of liberalism Dewey stressed the 
need for strong controls to overcome capitalism’s fracturing effects:
The only form of enduring social organization that is now possible is one in 
which the new forces of production are cooperatively controlled and used 
in the interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of the 
individuals that constitute society. … Organized social planning, put into 
effect for the creation of an order in which industry and finance are socially 
directed in behalf of institutions that provide the material basis for the cul-
tural liberation and growth of individuals, is now the sole method of social 
action by which liberalism can realize its professed aims. (1991, pp. 59-60)
Dewey targets other philosophers here, but the political commitments he 
expresses undergird his vision for education, specifically, that it should enable “or-
ganized social planning” by acting as a two-pronged lever for “cultural liberation” 
from economic forces as well as “growth of individuals.” This monistic argument 
was aimed at his contemporaries who, he wrote, “define liberalism in terms of the 
old opposition between the province of organized social action and the province of 
purely individual initiative and effort,” arguing that “wittingly or unwittingly, they 
still provide the intellectual system of apologetics for the existing economic regime, 
which they strangely, it would seem ironically, uphold as a regime of individual lib-
erty for all” (1991, p. 35). Individualism, the centerpiece of classical liberal theory, 
now served as a system of justification for class divisions, social problems, and moral 
depravations, a point that impugned competing curricular ideologies founded on it. 
In contrast, experience conveyed the significance of individual agency not merely 
as an expression of will, but as a historical intervention into modern consciousness.
To summarize, Dewey’s broad aims involved developing a conceptual system 
capable of helping control the economic forces of production, distribution, and con-
sumption through regulative means at various levels: the state, the local commu-
nity, and individual subjectivity. An obvious and primary mechanism for effecting 
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these changes was the school, where the desire to form a “new psychological and 
moral type” (Dewey, 1999b, p. 40) of individual would be “achieved only through 
the controlled use of all the resources of science and technology that have mastered 
the physical forces of nature” (p. 46). An adequate curriculum theory would outline 
how this could be accomplished without perpetuating economic injustices or resort-
ing to indoctrination. In Dewey’s view, other proposals failed on these accounts. 
Dewey’s unique solution was to have children learn to direct scientific and 
technological processes and remake themselves as democratic agents in curriculum 
organized around experience. A more collaborative and socially organized form 
of schooling would be the primary way “cooperative experimental intelligence 
finds its way into the working structure of individuals” (Dewey, 1999b, p. 53). To 
this end, experience served as both a principle for practice and as an integrative 
concept that would systematically help solve some of the problems he detected in 
other theories, namely, their complicity in perpetuating capitalist ideologies at 
the expense of democratic, social, and individual development. And because their 
practices reflected faulty theorizing, also needed was a curricular logic that would 
yield new ways of teaching and learning capable of serving the social and political 
ends Dewey sought. In order to illustrate what this specifically meant for Dewey, 
we turn to ideas he elaborated most during the Lab School period. 
Dewey’s Curricular Logic: Culture Epochs and Occupations 
Dewey’s affinity for a culture concept is apparent early on. His Pedagogic Creed (1897) 
begins by linking the individual and culture through education: “I believe that all 
education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social conscious-
ness of the race. . . . Through this unconscious education the individual gradually 
comes to share in the intellectual and moral resources which humanity has suc-
ceeded in getting together. He becomes an inheritor of the funded capital of civili-
zation” (para. 1). Here Dewey is stating a basic assumption: the task of schooling is 
to direct these naturally occurring processes in socially productive and individually 
fulfilling directions. How best to accomplish this was (and is) the problem facing 
curriculum theorists, and Dewey’s logic on this point was perhaps clearest as he was 
establishing his school at the University of Chicago (Kliebard, 2006). Two guiding 
concepts, detailed most during this period, served as a means of organization and 
a mode of delivery: culture epochs and occupations. 
Culture epochs 
Fallace (2008) discusses two major influences on the social sciences at the turn of 
the nineteenth century: evolutionary psychology and anthropology. These influ-
ences, he notes, indelibly shaped Dewey’s thinking. Despite later being discredited, 
one idea popular among Herbartian reformers, with whom Dewey was briefly af-
filiated, left a particular mark on his thinking: ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. In 
curricular terms, this meant that “the cultural products of each epoch will contain 
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that which appeals most sympathetically and closely to the child at that epoch” 
(Dewey, 1896a, p. 247). Put otherwise, this view held that children’s developmental 
stages “corresponded with the evolutionary stages of Western civilization” (Fallace, 
p. 383). Thus, when Dewey argued that learning involves “repeating the race experi-
ence” (Dewey, 1896b, p. 440), he implies that children’s psychological growth can be 
reconciled with knowledge of cultural evolution (Fallace). Educationally, this means 
that children progressively come to understand disciplinary knowledge in “a fuller 
and richer and also more organized form, a form that gradually approximates that in 
which subject matter is presented to the skilled, mature person” (Dewey, 1938, p. 74).
Despite his affinity for the general idea, Dewey scorned the belief that in-
dividual development corresponded literally to phases in human evolution (see 
1896a). But, in providing an “orderly and cumulative narrative” (Dewey, 1900, p. 
223), the ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny idea furnished Dewey with a practi-
cally useful and conceptually rich way to consider curriculum organization. Im-
portantly, this separated him from humanists, who advocated for the organization 
of knowledge through the disciplines of history, science, literature, Latin, and so 
on (Kliebard, 1995). Dewey rejected these divisions but agreed with humanists in 
one respect: that schooling’s main aim is to promote the mastery of civilizational 
funds of knowledge. He wrote in 1899: “All that society has accomplished for itself 
is put, through the agency of the school, at the disposal of its future members” (p. 
455). Dewey also criticized humanists on the grounds that presenting disciplinary 
knowledge as a finished product required that interest be generated from outside 
the student (using “devices of art to cover up the imposition”; 1938, p. 19). He in-
stead saw interest and subject matter as two sides of the same coin, a fluid aspect 
of ongoing social practices. 
Turning to social practices and not individual psychology as the unit of con-
cern solved both a conceptual and a pedagogical problem: involving children di-
rectly in these practices would naturally unite interest and subject matter, elimi-
nating their dichotomy (this was a main subject in The Child and the Curriculum). 
It also addressed a political issue, since, through the culture epochs approach, “the 
mind is introduced to much more fundamental and controlling influences than ap-
pear in the political and chronological records that usually pass for history” (Dewey, 
1899, p. 463). The “fundamental and controlling influences” to which he refers are 
human needs and impulses on the one hand, and the availability of natural and 
cultural resources to fulfill them, on the other.
Dewey was critical of other culture epochs adherents, particularly those who 
used literature to convey knowledge of an era that presumably aligned with a child’s 
psychological stage. He took a thematic, rather than a literal, view of the theory:
Children are interested directly in present life, in the social conditions 
which exist all about them and with which they come in contact; and 
any genuine, any educative historic interest is simply a reflex of this in-
terest in the existing social structure. If there be such a thing in the child 
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as a nomadic interest, it finds its natural and direct prey not in the shift-
ing hordes of semi-barbaric tribes as they wandered with the flocks over 
half-barren territory, but in the railway and steamboat before his eyes . . 
. Let this movement be realized and then there is a basis for considering 
other modes of movements, and other relationships between ox and man! 
(Dewey, 1896a, pp. 251-252)
Seeing culture epochs thematically prompted Dewey to promote active par-
ticipation in social practices rather than simply to read about them. This led him to 
develop specific meanings and functions for concepts like “interest” and “relevance.” 
For him, they began with a consideration of subject matter, child psychology, and 
anthropology, and not merely with the interests of individual children in a given 
lesson. In fact, he repudiated this practice: “The child has his own instincts and 
tendencies, but we do not know what these mean until we can translate them into 
their social equivalents. We must be able to carry them back into a social past and 
see them as the inheritance of previous race activities” (Dewey, 1897, para 4). Inter-
est and relevance as key features of experience were not stand-alone concepts, but 
captured the unity of emerging psychological stages with phases in the evolution 
of civilization, from which more sophisticated conceptual understanding could be 
derived. Unifying the psychological and historical dimensions of experience through 
such principles was a major theoretical advance. Practically, they would be mani-
fested and directed through the instructional vehicle of occupations.
Occupations 
Kliebard (1995) describes Dewey’s notion of occupations as “the characteristic activi-
ties in which the individual or society engaged and the ability of those individuals 
to achieve command of their environment” (p. 61). Activities such as gardening, 
printing, and building were not just jobs people did; they were the unity of societal 
progress and individual expression, encoded in material practices. “Industrial arts,” 
Dewey (1958) wrote, “are the type-forms of experience that bring to light the sequen-
tial connections of things with one another” (p. 84). This was another basic assump-
tion, which Dewey elaborated as a curricular principle. Occupations, in his logic, 
“shall not be mere practical devices or modes of routine employment, the gaining 
of better skills as cooks, seamstresses, or carpenters, but active centers of scientific 
insight into natural materials and processes, points of departure whence children 
shall be led out into a realization of the historic development of man” (1899, p. 462). 
The instructional goal was therefore to progressively organize tasks so the seem-
ing coherence of simple operations could be unraveled and interpreted, revealing a 
rich history as well as a responsiveness to innovation. Day-to-day schooling would 
therefore involve active participation by children in tasks that constituted “mak-
ing a living” throughout history, forms of social practice developed to bring nature 
under human control—the fundamental process of living socially in the world. 
A surface feature of occupations was that children would learn by coopera-
tively solving problems, a notion that, as we pointed out earlier, has become axiom-
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atic in the EBL literature (e.g., Savery & Duffy, 1996). But, like interest and relevance, 
grasping Dewey’s deeper conception of problem solving requires attention to his 
overall framework, especially the role of subject matter. Speaking to this point, Kli-
ebard (2006) wrote, “when human beings eat, they do not eat in general, they eat 
food. They do not simply play an instrument, they play something on that instru-
ment” (p. 115). Problem solving, in Dewey’s framework, was indivisible from subject 
matter; he did not mean it in general. In occupations, children participated firsthand 
in situations that had been intentionally orchestrated to recapitulate problems that 
had vexed humanity at various phases in the development of civilization, with the 
conceptual and material tools that were available at the time (see e.g., Tanner, 1997). 
Hands-on activity played a crucial role in learning through occupations, for 
essential to their pedagogical effectiveness was the way tools functioned, that is, 
the requisite equipment and its customs for use. Stemming from his early study of 
Hegel, Dewey shared with Marx the view that labor was the paradigmatic expres-
sion of human creativity, the nexus of cultural knowledge communicated through 
material artifacts, and the starting point for individual and collective innovation 
(Garrison, 1995; Miettinen, 2001, 2006). This meant that tools played a key role in 
mastering mature concepts. Existing societal conventions—what he called preju-
dices—were not only held cognitively, but were “welded into the genuine materi-
als of first-hand experience” and “may become organs of enrichment if they are 
detected and reflected upon” (Dewey, 1958, p. 37). Occupations were therefore not 
simply enriching pedagogical devices or pretexts for cooperative learning; they were 
instrumental in mastering subject matter knowledge organized “longitudinally” 
according to culture epochs. Using them in this way “permits and requires greater 
definiteness, corresponding to the gain of mental concentration made in the year—
greater abstractness, if the word is used in the sense of an intentional simplification 
of existing experience, through elimination of certain elements and emphasis of 
others, conducted to bring out a special idea” (Dewey, 1900, p. 222). Importantly, 
gleaning “special ideas” through solving historical problems was central both to 
progressively achieving more complex forms of thinking—what Vygotskyans might 
call the appropriation of scientific concepts (Mayer, 2009)—and to gaining control 
over modern social and technological processes. Such special ideas, once worked 
out and reflected upon during lessons, could be directed to current problems as a 
“method of analysis of existing social life, not as affording information about some-
thing past and gone” (1900, p. 223). Problem solving therefore involved the shared 
use of culturally available tools in progressively engaging with humankind’s his-
torical challenges, and was to be the central method in Dewey’s curriculum, the 
realization of experience at any given instance and the fodder for subsequent reflec-
tion and experimentation. Rather than being an end in itself, problem solving was 
a means of grasping scientific principles so children could direct them to modern 
social and technological issues.
Despite moving away from the specifics of the culture epochs curriculum 
after leaving Chicago (Fallace, 2010), what Dewey continued to cultivate through 
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his curricular conception of experience—subject matter knowledge organized 
systematically to help children jointly understand and direct technological and 
economic processes as well as their own development—was an aesthetic and “un-
alienated” (Westbrook, 1993) engagement with labor and a close appreciation for 
the role of modern science in expanding human capabilities. Such self-conscious 
engagement in practical conduct and intellectual inquiry signaled what Dewey 
called “the method of experimental intelligence.” This was a social imperative as 
much as it was an individual, reflective trait:
The method of experimental intelligence as the method of action cannot be 
established as a constant and operative habit of mind and character apart 
from education. But it cannot be established within education except as 
the activities of the latter are founded on a clear idea of the active social 
forces of the day, of what they are doing, of their effect, for good and harm, 
upon values, and except as this idea and ideal are acted upon to direct 
experimentation in the currents of social life that run outside the school 
and that condition the educational meaning of whatever the school does. 
(Dewey, 1933, pp. 103)
When, in Experience and Education (1938), Dewey critiqued other curricular 
ideologies—humanism, vocationalism, “child centered” progressivism—for not hav-
ing a defensible philosophy of experience, it was not because they were not political 
enough, not active or cooperative enough, did not take the learner’s interests seri-
ously, or did not adequately emphasize subject matter, for they variously included 
these elements. It was on the grounds that they failed as curriculum theories ca-
pable of fostering the expansion of cultural resources and development of individu-
als as well as for providing the means for experimenting with solutions to societal 
problems accelerating under rampant capitalism. This is the conceptual apparatus 
Dewey sought to provide when he applied experience to education.
Discussion and Implications 
In foregrounding Dewey’s cultural and economic analysis and his specific curric-
ular logic as we have here, the profoundly social nature of experience comes into 
sharper view. Our argument suggests that Dewey was not primarily concerned with 
meaningful individual learning, with designing interventions to foster “a limited 
field of mutually kindly relations among individuals” (1989, p.125), or even with 
inciting civic participation as such. “The problems to be solved are general, not lo-
cal,” he wrote. “They concern complex forces that are at work throughout the whole 
country, not those limited to an immediate and almost face-to-face environment” 
(Dewey, 1999b, p. 46). With this sentiment in mind, he developed experience si-
multaneously as a basis for systematically engaging students in learning activities 
that would support historically new forms of social and individual growth, and for 
reconciling theoretical problems across seemingly incommensurable domains, from 
individual motivation to the historical path of civilization. At root, experience was 
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central to an educational and conceptual system Dewey developed to address some 
of the most troubling historical, social, economic, and political problems affecting 
schooling in the early twentieth century.
It is clear the complex philosophical and practical work experience was made 
to do when Dewey applied it to educational problems. The term’s burden was com-
pounded by its perpetual confusion with commonsense psychological meanings, 
a main reason he abandoned it (Dewey, 1981). The continued tendency to confuse 
the term in this way, or to break it down into fragments—such as active learning, 
problem solving, and reflection—quickly puts such key ideas out of touch with his 
broader theoretical framework and his radical political agenda. One implication 
is that strong links between Dewey’s conception of experience and modern EBL 
practices such as internships, wilderness programs, and simulation exercises have 
yet to be firmly established. In addition, not only does a piecemeal interpretation 
undermine strong claims to Deweyan parentage, it seems unlikely to help clarify 
his overall philosophy or apply it in fresh ways to contemporary problems. 
Finding value in elements of Dewey’s theory may, however, be inevitable given 
how impracticable Dewey’s full program now seems, and how limited his impact 
on education actually was (Kliebard, 1995; Westbrook, 1993). We doubt this is sim-
ply a failure of imagination; the intermittent success of experience-based reforms 
throughout the twentieth century suggests that schools are resilient places that 
shape reforms, rather than reforms shaping schools (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). And, 
even where modern reforms have achieved widespread success—service learning 
provides one example (Giles & Eyler, 1994)—many instances actually look very simi-
lar to initiatives that Dewey only equivocally supported, such as manual training, 
the project method, and the experience curriculum (Kliebard, 1995). Nonetheless, 
engaging more carefully with Dewey’s full curriculum theory may help envision 
new possibilities given current conditions and priorities.
We also wish to raise the possibility that Dewey’s notion of experience, as 
we have presented it, may actually bear more of a resemblance to contemporary 
programs that do not claim to be experience based per se, than to those that have 
made this claim explicitly. We briefly entertain this by turning now to current work 
that elaborates on the priorities we have outlined, namely the critical pragmatism 
of Kadlec (2007), Glaude (2007), and Green (2008), and the radical-local teaching 
approach described by Hedegaard and Chaiklin (2005). 
Critical pragmatism 
Surprisingly, the social justice and critical pedagogy literature often cites Dewey’s 
work without drawing on his critiques of political economy sketched above. However, 
we see clear parallels: in general, critical pedagogy analyzes the multiple ways eco-
nomic and social practices infuse schooling (and educational thought) to perpetu-
ate social inequalities (Apple, 1990; Delpit, 1995; Fletcher, 2000; Freire, 1988; Giroux, 
2001). Unlike the account of Dewey’s thought we offer here, critical pedagogy has been 
repeatedly criticized for its focus on analysis without providing adequate resources 
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for responding to the oppressive circumstances it critiques (Ellsworth, 1989). When it 
does offer curricular direction, the focus is often on fostering agency by engaging in 
successful political action.2
In contrast, Dewey combined social and economic critique with a conception of 
individual agency that strove to concretely realize democratic social relations through 
the workings of culture. The critical potential of Dewey’s far-reaching, pragmatic 
thought is the focus of a growing body of contemporary work in critical pragmatism 
(e.g., Glaude, 2007; Green, 1999, 2008; Harris, 1999) with roots also in W. E. B. Dubois’s 
and Alain Locke’s work. While a full survey is beyond the scope of this discussion, 
this literature offers resources for elaborating the educational implications of Dewey’s 
work and his theory of experience in particular. Kadlec (1996) made this point when 
she argued that Dewey’s conception of experience can underwrite a democratic 
social reconstruction where “lived experience is a tool for meaningful democratic 
struggle to the extent that it consists of a critical and forward-thinking perception 
of the private and shared consequences of our actions” (p. 522).
One of the most profound aspects of Dewey’s framework of experience is its 
attempt to develop a unified theory of individual agency with the awareness that 
capitalism influences us “all the way down.” The result is that Dewey provides a vi-
sion for individual agency grounded within the conditions of social oppression. The 
difference turns on the pragmatic dimensions of experience as central to knowing. 
As Kadlec (1996) argued,
For critical pragmatists such as Dewey, the point of reflective inquiry is not 
to generate final principles, but rather to improve our capacity for tapping 
into the critical potential of lived experience in a world defined by flux and 
change. The political, social, and economic challenges we face require that 
we arm ourselves not with fixed absolutes, but rather with a commitment 
to open-ended and flexible inquiry aimed not at final consensus about our 
aims, but rather at achieving a greater understanding of the consequences 
of our practices and policies. (p. 542)
Contemporary critical pragmatists share Dewey’s commitment to a social 
theory of individualism, which challenges the liberal conception still dominating 
educational thought—that individualism is marked by independence from others. 
Instead, critical pragmatists maintain that individualism emerges through acting 
with others. They are putting this ontological assumption to work to reconstruct 
local democratic relationships as well as the features of industrial capitalism that 
shape them. Critical pragmatists might benefit from studying the specific cur-
ricular models Dewey designed to foster collaboration, creativity, and disciplinary 
knowledge so children can self-consciously engage in the reconstruction of social 
practices while developing the habits of critical inquiry necessary for realizing 
themselves as democratic agents. 
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Radical-local teaching and learning 
Where critical pragmatists extend the Deweyan themes of individual agency and 
social reconstruction, Hedegaard and Chaiklin (2005), working in the Marxist 
dialectical tradition of cultural-historical activity theory, indirectly develop other 
themes. They cite Dewey only once in their text, yet their program can be read as 
an extension of Deweyan priorities; specifically, their “radical-local” approach to 
teaching and learning is aimed at helping children connect everyday knowledge 
with general or scientific knowledge, use historically derived models as a tool for 
solving contemporary problems, personally identify with the motives of various 
social practices, and advocate for improved social conditions. They wrote:
The idea of radical-local teaching and learning is to plan and implement 
teaching practices that serve to develop a pupil’s knowledge of subject-mater 
content in a way that is related to the cultural-historical conditions of the 
children’s lives. This knowledge should serve as intellectual tools that can 
be used to understand and act in relation to those conditions—both the 
specific historically developed conditions in the children’s neighborhood, 
and larger patterns that reflect historical epochs or general cultural change 
within traditions of practice. (p. 101) 
Several features of Hedegaard and Chaiklin’s (2005) radical-local approach 
are comparable to Dewey’s curricular logic, viewable through their example of an 
afterschool program involving Puerto Rican middle schoolers in New York City. 
First is the development of teaching practices based on a preemptory historical 
analysis of local conditions pertaining to the children’s particular cultural legacy 
(in their example, how and why Puerto Ricans followed particular settlement pat-
terns). This feature resembles the kind of analysis a teacher would have needed to 
do to understand the present-day ramifications of a culture epoch. Second is the 
articulation of “core models” comprised of basic conceptual elements of social and 
Figure 1. Core Model of Basic Conceptual Relations Used to Plan NYC 
Curriculum Unit3
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economic relations among people, used for planning children’s activities. This 
feature resembles the distillation of special ideas students would be expected to 
glean in Dewey’s program (Figure 1 illustrates these elements in Hedegaard and 
Chaiklin’s example). Lastly, children’s appropriation of these basic conceptual re-
lations was multiphasic, moving through the development of personal goals and 
conceptual models via hands-on exercises and field research, to later using their 
models to analyze historical and modern social conditions and make specific rec-
ommendations for improving conditions within their communities. The intent be-
hind these methods was to help children acquire “concepts, methods and motives 
that enable new possibilities for action, investigation and reflection about aspects 
of one’s life” (p. 184). We see these methods and priorities as analogous to Dewey’s 
use of occupations as an engaging means of imparting conceptual tools for analyz-
ing present-day conditions.
Two additional features of the radical-local approach deserve mention. First, 
its developmental aims were not conceived abstractly in the unit Hedegaard and 
Chaiklin describe, but in relation to the concrete historical and social conditions 
that form the basis for children’s everyday knowledge. This strikes us as highly con-
sistent with Dewey’s pragmatism and his rejection of dualist epistemologies. Sec-
ond, teachers did not teach the core model to children directly, but rather planned 
tasks involving collaboration with each other and with community members in 
processes of inquiry; in other words, they discovered these conceptual relations 
through their own labor during specially conceived learning experiences, meant 
in the expansive sense we have attributed to Dewey. These links may give reason to 
think of activity in the CHAT sense as roughly equivalent to experience in Dewey’s 
sense (cf. Mayer, 2009; Miettinen, 2001).
Our discussion of current trends in critical pragmatism, which is extending 
Dewey’s work on agency and social transformation, and cultural-historical activity 
theory, which is extending the themes of historical analysis, concept development, 
and material activity as crucial to learning and development, were only cursory. 
Interestingly, neither identify strongly with Dewey’s concept of experience, even 
though we see clear parallels that could be elaborated in the future. One benefit of 
incorporating experience into these lines of scholarship is the breadth of Dewey’s 
writing on the topic, which could help scholars integrate other philosophical do-
mains, such as aesthetics and ethics, into their programs.
Conclusion 
In comments about his decision to replace experience with culture upon revising 
Experience and Nature, Dewey remarked that he had used experience “to designate, 
in a summary fashion, all that is distinctively human” (1981, p. 331). He lamented 
that experience had become almost exclusively identified with “experience in the 
sense of the psychological, and the psychological has become established as that 
which is intrinsically psychical, mental, private” (p. 362). This was never his intent. In 
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contrast, he approvingly cited the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who wrote: 
“culture is at the same time psychological and collective” (p. 364). Articulating the 
philosophical relationships between the psychological, social, and natural worlds, 
while establishing a democratic vision for rationally deliberated, just ends, remained 
Dewey’s lifelong project. Experience served this project for a time and it may yet 
provide new ideas for addressing present-day educational and social problems. 
Notes
1. For example, classical critical theorists like Max Horkheimer outright reject Dewey’s 
pragmatism as contributing to critical theory (see Horkheimer, 1947). More recently, see 
Frank Margonis’s (2009) rejection of Dewey’s educational program due to what he reads as 
Dewey’s implicit racism.
2. For example, Allman argues: “critical perception of reality enables people to know 
what needs changing” (1999; Hill, 2008; see also McLaren, 2003). The task, these theorists 
argue, is to act for such change, thereby seeing agency as evidence that students are coun-
tering class oppression. 
3. Hedegaard & Chaiklin, 2005, p. 114. Copyright Marianne Hedegaard and Seth Chai-
klin and Aarhus University Press. Used with permission. 
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